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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
HOMICIDE-DEFEASANCE OF SLAYER'S CLAIM TO PROPERTY OR CONTRACT
RIGHTS ACCRUING AT VICTIM'S DEATH-UNINTENDED OR NON-CRIMINAL
KILLING-[Missouri].-A conveyed a parcel of land to B with a provision
that title to the land should revert if B should predecease A. The grantor
killed the grantee and immediately thereafter was adjudged insane. The
guardian of the insane grantor sold the land to plaintiff, who brought an
action to quiet title against the original grantee's heirs. Held for plaintiff,
title having reverted to A, the insane grantor, under the terms of the con-
veyance. The rule that a person cannot benefit by his own wrong was held
inoperative to deprive A of the property since he was insane at the time of
the homicide.'
The instant case seems to be the first involving the effect, upon a rever-
sioner's right to take, of his having slain the prior tenant. However, a
similar problem has frequently arisen in connection with descent, insurance,
and wills.
By statute in twenty-five states2 and by decision in others,3 a murderer
is not permitted to take, under the statute of descent, the property of the
murdered intestate. However, the slayer may take by descent where (1) at
the time of the killing he was insane4 or (2) the killing was unintentional
and the result of provocation. 5
Similarly, where the beneficiary of a life insurance policy murders the
insured, recovery is denied to the beneficiary.6 Recovery by the insured's
administrator is, however, often allowed, thereby enabling the murderer to
take a distributive share of the insurance from the estate in the event that
the murderer is an heir at law of the insured and that the particular juris-
1. Eisenhardt v. Siegel (Mo. 1938) 119 S. W. (2d) 810.
2. See Note (1936) 49 Harv. L. Rev. 715, and Note (1934) 44 Yale
L. J. 164 for a compilation of the states that have passed this type of
statute. Arkansas, Ark. Craw & Moses' Stat. (Supp. 1927) sec. 3514a,
3514b; Kansas, Kan. Rev. Stat. Anno. (1923) sec. 22-133; and Oklahoma,
Okla. Harlow's Stat. (1931) see. 1616, are in this group.
3. Price v. Hitaffer (1933) 164 Md. 505, 165 Atl. 470; Garwols v. Bank-
ers' Trust Co. (1930) 251 Mich. 420, 232 N. W. 239; Perry v. Strawbridge
(1907) 209 Mo. 621, 108 S. W. 641, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 244, 123 Am. St.
Rep. 510, 14 Ann. Cas. 92; Van Alstyne v. Tuffy (Sup. Ct. 1918) 103 Misc.
455, 169 N. Y. S. 173; In re Sigsworth [1935] 1 Ch. 89, 104 L. J. Ch. 46.
Contra: Hagan v. Cone (1917) 21 Ga. App. 416, 94 S. E. 602; Wall v. Pfan-
schmidt (1914) 265 Ill. 180, 106 N. E. 785, L. R. A. 1915C 328, Ann. Cas.
1916A 674, in which it is stated that the courts denying murderer recovery
are really guilty of judicial legislation, since the statute of descent does
not provide for any exception. This reasoning has been supported by many
cases. See also Note (1936) 49 Harv. L. Rev. 715; and Shellenberger v.
Ransom (1894) 41 Neb. 631, 59 N. W. 935.
4. In re Houghton [1915] 2 Ch. 173; In re Pitts [1931] 1 Ch. 546.
5. In re Wolf (Surr. Ct. 1914) 88 Misc. 433, 150 N. Y. S. 738. See In
re Kirby's Estate (1912) 162 Cal. 91, 121 Pac. 370, 39 L. R. A. (N. S.)
1088; Hogg v. Witham (1926) 120 Kan. 341, 242 Pac. 1021, in which cases
there was a statute which prevented a convicted murderer from taking by
descent. Both courts held that the statute should be strictly construed and
that the slayer should be allowed to take when he was convicted of mere
manslaughter.
6. See Note (1930) 70 A. L. R. 1539.
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diction allows the murderer to take by descent. 7 Other states have avoided
this latter result by denying recovery to the administrator of the insured
if the insured's estate is already sufficient to pay creditors,8 or by holding
that the administrator is to take the insurance and distribute the same as
if the murderer had predeceased the insured, thereby giving the proceeds
to the insured's heirs at law exclusive of the murdrer and his heirs.9 Again,
however, where the beneficiary was insane at the time that he committed
the homicide,' 0 or where the homicide was unintentional and therefore
merely involuntary manslaughter," he may recover.
A devisee under a will who murders the testator cannot recover,22 even,
so it has been held, though the homicide was a mere unintentional killing
and therefore only manslaughter."s It is immaterial that the murderer did
not know of the will or the devise.14 However, where the slayer was insane,
he is entitled to take under the will of the victim.'s
The rule that a sane murderer is not entitled to the property of the
victim16 is based on the maxim that a person cannot benefit by his own
wrong. Where the slayer is insane, the courts have uniformly held that
he can recover, the maxim no longer being applicable because the homicide
was not a crime or a felony,' or because the homicide was not intentional.18
This conflict of reasoning becomes significant in the cases of involuntary
manslaughter. Some courts allow recovery because the homicide was no
longer intentional;19 others deny recovery because a felony still existed.20
7. Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Weightman (1916) 61 Okda. 106,
160 Pac. 629; Murchison v. Murchison (Tex. Civ. App. 1918) 203 S. W. 423.
8. Johnston v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (1919) 85 W. Va. 70, 100 S. E.
865; Wickline v. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co. (1928) 106 W. Va. 424, 145
S. E. 743.
9. Slocum v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (1923) 245 Mass. 565, 139 N. E.
816, 27 A. L. R. 1517; De Zotell v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. (1932) 60 S. D.
532, 245 N. W. 58.
10. Holdom v. Ancient Order of United Workmen (1895) 159 Ill. 619, 43
N. E. 772, 31 L. R. A. 67, 50 Am. St. Rep. 183; New York Life Ins. Co. v.
Veith (Tex. Civ. App. 1917) 192 S. W. 605.
11. Schreiner v. High Court of Illinois Catholic Order of Foresters
(1890) 35 Ill. App. 576; Hull v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (1917) 26 Pa.
Dist. Rep. 197; contra, De Zotell v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. (1932) 60 S. D.
532, 245 N. W. 58.
12. Riggs v. Palmer (1889) 115 N. Y. 506, 22 N. E. 188, 5 L. R. A.
340, 12 Am. St. Rep. 319; Estate of Wilkins (1927) 192 Wis. 111, 211 N. AV.
653; cf. Ellerson v. Westcott (1896) 148 N. Y. 149, 42 N. E. 540, where
the court allowed the murderer to take the legal title but said by way of
dictum that a court of equity would intervene and prevent the enjoyment
of the estate by the murderer.
13. In re Hall [1914] P. 1; Lundy v. Lundy (1895) 24 Can. Sup. Ct.
650, rev'g McKinnon v. Lundy (1894) 21 Ont. App. 560.
14. Estate of Wilkins (1927) 192 Wis. 111, 122 N. W. 653.
15. In re Pitts [1931] 1 Ch. 546.
16. Supra, notes 2, 3, and 12; Note (1930) 70 A. L. R. 1539.
17. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Veith (Tex. Civ. App. 1917) 192 S. W.
605; In re Houghton [1915] 2 Ch. 173; In re Pitts [1931] 1 Ch. 546.
18. Holdom v. Ancient Order of United Workmen (1895) 159 Ill. 619, 43
N. E. 772, 31 L. R. A. 67, 50 Am. St. Rep. 183.
19. Schreiner v. High Court of Illinois Catholic Order of Foresters
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It will be noted that while the maxim is thus sometimes applied to cases
of involuntary manslaughter, the policy behind the maxim, viz., to deter
the commission of crimes for the purpose of obtaining property, cannot be
said to apply to accidental or unintentional killings. It is nevertheless sub-
mitted that the maxim should be applied, according to its terms, to all cases
of felonies, whether committed by accident or with intent to take the life
of the victim. By adoption of a rule that the felon will always be denied
recovery while recovery will be allowed where there is no legal wrong,21
there will be resultant simplicity and certainty of application of the maxim
which in the writer's judgment will more than compensate for disregarding
the rationale of deterrence.
E. M. S.
INSURANCE--CANCELLATION BY MAMn[Texas].-In a recent Texas case
insured sued on an accident policy which contained a clause providing for
cancellation by the company by written notice mailed to insured's last ad-
dress as shown by the records of the company. Notice of cancellation was
mailed by the company the day before the accident on which the suit was
based. Insured contended that the cancellation was not effective until he
received the notice. Held, that under this cancellation clause, the notice was
effective when mailed.'
There is some conflict of authority as to whether notice of cancellation
sent by mail must be received before becoming effective.2 However, a sub-
stantial preponderance of the decisions holds that notice of cancellation sent
by mail must be received to be effective.3
The leading case supporting the instant decision is Wotunter v. United
States Casualty Co.,4 where it was said that "the assured assumed the risk
of due receipt of that notice." 5 In Dent v. Monarch Life Ins. Co.,6 reaching
(1890) 35 I1. App. 576; In re Wolf (Surr. Ct. 1914) 88 Misc. 433, 150
N. Y. S. 738; Hull v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (1917) 26 Pa. Dist. Rep.
197.
20. De Zotell v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. (1932) 60 S. D. 532, 245 N. W. 58;
In re Hall [1914] P. 1; Lundy v. Lundy (1895) 24 Can. Sup. Ct. 650, rev'g
McKinnon v. Lundy (1894) 21 Ont. App. 560.
21. E. g., where a homicide is justifiable or committed by an insane per-
son.
1. California-Western States Life Ins. Co. v. Williams (Tex. Civ. App.
1938) 120 S. W. (2d) 844.
2. 6 Couch, Cyclopedia of Insurance Law (1st ed. 1930) 5094, sec. 1440.
For a discussion of the question with reference to fire insurance policies,
see Note (1914) 50 L. PM A. (N. S.) 35.
3. American Fire Ins. Co. v. Brooks (1896) 83 Md. 22, 34 AtI. 373;
Healey v. Ins. Co. of Pa. (1900) 50 App. Div. 327, 63 N. Y. S. 1055; 5
Cooley, Briefs on Insurance (2d ed. 1927) 4589.
4. (1919) 126 Va. 156, 101 S. E. 58. The case was finally decided on
the question of proper address, but the decision on the sufficiency of mailing
of notice was necessary to the disposition of the case and is therefore not
mere dictum.
5. 126 Va. at 166, 101 S. E. at 61.
6. (1936) 231 Mo. App. 283, 98 S. W. (2d) 123.
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